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which indicates a judicial predisposition that is wrongful or inappropriate. 91 Similarly, because section 455(a) speaks of "partiality", a term
that only refers to such favoritism that is wrongful or inappropriate, its
requirement of recusal whenever a question of a judge's impartiality
92
exists does not preclude the doctrine's application.
VI. PRACTICAL ADVICE
Conditions of potential bias or misconduct before or during a trial
should be addressed by a motion for mistrial or motion for recusal,
sometimes called a motion for disqualification. 93 Errors or conditions
discovered after trial may be raised on appeal. In either case, appellate
courts will require a record of the proceedings in order to gauge whether
thejudgehad an opportunity to correct any errors in response to counsel's
timely objection. Another option is for counsel to voir dire the motion to
recuse. Such a step will not endear counsel to the trial judge, but by this
point the relationship between counsel and the court will probably have
deteriorated enough to permit such a choice to be made without further
harm to the client's cause.
Making the record entails getting rulings and comments on the
record, including exchanges in chambers in their entirety. In a capital
case, nothing should be "off the record."
Motions to disqualify state and local judges should use arguments
based on both the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(C). As previously discussed, the
Canons are essentially similar to 28 U.S.C. § 455. Therefore, it ispossible
to argue by analogy and cite federal precedents decided under section 455

9t Id.
92 Id. at 1156.
93 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-153 (1990) states:
When the judge of a circuit court in which a prosecution is
pending is connected with the accused or party injured, or is so
situated in respect to the case as in his opinion to render it
improper that he should preside at the trial, or if he has rejected

that parallel the relevant Canons. Motion for mistrial can also be made
at this point, using both the Canons and federal law to bolster the
argument.
As a last resort, any serious judicial misconduct which violates the
Canons of Judicial Conduct shouldbe reported to the Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission. While such a complaint may not require reversal,
it sends a message to other judges that such behavior will not be accepted
passively.
When faced with disqualifying a federal judge, counsel can argue
that due process requirements supplement the federal statutory claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 455.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court did not limit the due process right
to an impartial judge to pecuniary situations that mirrored those present
in WardandTumey. Rather, the Court expanded the due process rationale
in Mayberry, Taylor andJohnson to include situations where the judge
became personally embroiled in the matter before him. Further expansion came with Webb, where prejudicial conduct towards a defense
witness was held to deny the defendant his due process right to an
impartial judge.
While not adopting an expansive view of this federal constitutional
standard, in Welsh the Virginia Court of Appeals did acknowledge that
in some cases bias, regardless of its form or source, may be so pervasive
as to offend due process. Counsel can then make challenges on both
federal and state grounds.

a plea bargain agreement submitted by both parties and the
parties do not agree that he may hear the case, he shall enter the
fact ofrecord and the clerk of the court shall at once certify this
fact to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and thereupon
another judge shall be appointed ....
See also Bacigal, Virginia CriminalProcedure(2d ed.), § 16-1.

THE "NEW AND IMPROVED" FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY: A BRIEF GUIDE
BY: PETER F. MORGAN
I. INTRODUCTION
With the recent passage of the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994,1
Congress dramatically increased the number of federal crimes for which
the Government may seek imposition of capital punishment. The substantive component of the Death Penalty Act both created new federal
offenses punishable by death and "revived" existing ones that had been
declared unconstitutional or appeared questionable in the wake of
Furmanv. Georgia.2 This revival was made possible by the procedural
I The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title VI, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959 (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 21 U.S.C.) (hereinafter
"Federal Death Penalty Act.")
2 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding death penalty as applied in all
jurisdictions unconstitutional).
3 See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). A working familiarity with the

component of the Act, which provides a uniform method of sentencing
for all federal capital offenses that is closely-modeled after the provisions
3
of the so-called "Federal Drug Kingpin Statute."
The above developments suggest at least the theoretical possibility
that the number of federal capital cases requiring appointed or retained
4
defense counsel in the Commonwealth will increase in the near future.
Accordingly, the following analysis of the current state of federal death
penalty law should prove helpful.

provisions of this earlier statute is assumed here. For a more in-depth
discussion, see O'Grady, WhatEvery Virginia CapitalDefenseAttorney
Should Know About the FederalDrug Kingpin Statute, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 6., No. 1, p. 4 0 (1993).
4 The actual impact of the statute on Virginia capital defense
practice may be minimal, as discussed infra in Part V-B.
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II. SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS: DEFINING CAPITAL
CRIMES
Capital murder is not a distinct offense under federal law in the
manner of Virginia Code section 18.2-3 1. Rather, Title 18 of the United
States Code provides that "[wihoever is guilty of murder in the first
degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life... ."5 The
basic definition of first-degree murder was not altered by the Death
Penalty Act, 6 merely the list of felonies which become capital offenses
when a killing occurs during their commission or attempt. 7 As a result
of the Act, the federal death penalty now extends to five basic categories
of predicate offenses:
A. Crimes Against the State
The Death Penalty Act made no major modifications to any of the
offenses in this category, all of which were capital prior to its passage.
These offenses include assassination of members of Congress, the
President or other high-ranking officials, or kidnapping which results in
the death of any of these individuals; 8 espionage; 9 and treason. 10
B. Crimes Implicating International Affairs

amended Code sections governing six offenses implicating international
affairs (genocide; killing of foreign officials, and torture, hostage taking,
terrorism, or alien smuggling resulting in death) to allow for capital
punishment. 11 The Act also created four "new" offenses in this category:
murder of U.S. nationals abroad, 12 violence against maritime navigation
or maritime fixed platforms resulting in death, 13 violence at airports
serving international civil aviation resulting in death,14 and use of
15
weapons of mass destruction where death results.
C. Interstate Commerce and Travel Crimes
The Death Penalty Act reinstated the death penalty provisions of the
Federal Kidnapping Act, 16 which had been repealed after being declared
unconstitutional in United States v. Jackson.17 It also revived several
existing capital offenses in this category, including willful destruction of
aircraft, motor vehicles, or their facilities where death results; use of
explosives resulting in death; destruction by arson or explosives of
property used in interstate commerce or belonging to the government,
provided itresults in death; mailing injurious articles where death results;
willful train-wrecking resulting in death; and aircraft piracy resulting in
death. 18 Two final capital offenses in this category, murder in aid of
racketeering activity and murder for hire involving interstate travel, were
newly-authorized by the Act. 19

As is the case with crimes against the State, most practitioners will
never encounter capital cases from this category. The Death Penalty Act

5 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111(b) (Supp. 1995.) This language was
substituted for the Code's former sentencing provision, which mandated
the death penalty for all first-degree murders except those designated
otherwise by a sentencing jury's verdict, but failed to provide any
standards to guide the jury's discretion. See Federal Death Penalty Act
of 1994, § 60003, 108 Stat. 1959, 1969; 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (1988)
(amended 1994). The amendment reflects the new uniform sentencing
procedures for all federal capital cases prescribed by the Death Penalty
Act, discussed infra in Part 1Il.
6 First-degree murder includes "[e]very murder perpetrated by
poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious,
and premeditated killing" or "perpetrated from a premeditated design
unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other
than him who is killed ..." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111 (a) (Supp. 1995). It also
includes any murder committed in the completion or attempt of numerous enumerated felonies, the list of which was expanded by the Death
Penalty Act.
7 Note that the language of the Code merely requires the defendant
to be guilty ofmurder in the first degree-there is no requirement that the
defendant be the sole or actual cause of the death of the decedent. Thus,
accomplices to federal capital offenses may also be subject to the death
penalty, provided they were sufficiently involved to warrant such liability as a constitutional matter. See Tison v.Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)
(holding capital punishment may be imposed if defendant participated in
major way in felony that resulted in murder, where participation evidenced reckless indifference to value of human life).
8 18 U.S.C. §§ 351(a),(b) and 1751(a),(b) (1988). Both of these
sections provide for punishment by reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1111,
discussed supra at note 6.
9 18 U.S.C.A. §794(a) (Supp. 1995). TheDeathPenaltyActmerely
amended this section to limit imposition of the death penalty to cases
where the death of a U.S. agent abroad results from the offense, or the
espionage directly concerns certain specified forms of information such
as nuclear weapons plans. As discussed infra in Part V-A, imposition of
capital punishment for espionage where no homicide results may be
constitutionally-impermissible.

10 18 U.S.C.A. § 2381 (Supp. 1995). For a discussion of the
constitutionality of this provision in cases where no homicide results, see
infra, Part V-A.
11 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1091(b)(1) (genocide), 1116(a) (killing of
foreign officials), 1203 (a)(hostage taking), 2332(a) (terrorism), 2340A(a)
(Supp. 1995) (torture); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(a) (Supp. 1995) (alien smuggling).
12 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1119 (Supp. 1995).
13 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2280 (Supp. 1995). This provision actually
represents a revival of sorts. Formerly, these sort of crimes were
governed by the more general provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) under
"the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."
However, that particular application of § 1111 (b) was struck down as
unconstitutional in the wake of Furman v. Georgia,cited supra at note
2. See United States v. Kaiser,545 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1977).
14 See § 18 U.S.C.A. § 37 (Supp. 1995).
15 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332a (Supp. 1995).
16 Pub. L. No. 772, ch. 645, § 1201, 62 Stat. 683, 760 (1948)
(amended 1972).
17 390 U.S. 7 (1968). This pre-Furman case struck down a
sentencing scheme in which capital defendants could only receive the
death penalty if they elected to plead not guilty and demanded ajury trial.
Id. at 572. A similar scheme in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), making robberies
which result in death a capital offense, was never repealed but conceded
by the Solicitor General to be unconstitutional. See Pope v. United
States, 392 U.S. 651 (1968) (per curiam). These procedures have been
superseded by the uniform sentencing provisions of the Death Penalty
Act.
18 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 34 (aircraft or motor vehicle destruction),
844(d) and (f) (explosives and destruction of property), 1716(i)(2)
(mailing injurious articles), 1992 (Supp. 1995) (wrecking trains); 49
U.S.C.A. App. § 1472(i) (Supp. 1995) (aircraft piracy).
19 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1958 (murder for hire), 1959(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1995) (racketeering).
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D. Killings in Federal Institutions or of Federal Personnel
In this category, the killing of certain law enforcement officials was
revived as a capital offense 20 while numerous new capital offenses were
authorized. The new offenses are: murder by federal life-term prison
inmates; 21 murderby escaped federal prisoners; 22 use of firearms during
attack on federal facilities that result in death; 23 murder of officials
assisting federal law enforcement, or of state correctional officers by
federal prisoners; 24 murder of federal court officers or jurors; 25 and
26
retaliatory killings of federal witnesses, victims, or informants.

E. High Profile Crimes
While diverse, all of the offenses in this final category are notable
for their obvious political significance: drug-trafficking and continuing
criminal enterprise, 27 carjackings,2 8 civil rights murders, 29 drive-by
shootings, 30 rape and child molestation resulting in death, 3 1 sexual
exploitation of children resulting in death, 32 and use of a firearm to
33
commit murder during federal crimes of violence.
II1. PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS: NARROWING
THE CLASS OF DEFENDANTS ELIGIBLE
FOR DEATH

20 18 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (Supp. 1995).
21 18 U.S.C.A. § 1118 (Supp. 1995).
22 18 U.S.C.A. § 1120 (Supp. 1995).
23 18 U.S.C.A. § 930(c) (Supp. 1995).
24 18 U.S.C.A. § 1121 (Supp. 1995).
25 18 U.S.C.A. § 1503 (Supp. 1995).
26 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1512(a)(2)(A) (murder of federal witnesses to
prevent their testimony or aid of investigation) and 1513(a)(2)(A) (Supp.
1995) (murder of witnesses, victims, or informants in retaliation).
27 21 U.S.C.A. § 3591(b) (Supp. 1995). The constitutional
problems associated with capital punishment for these offenses when
they do not result in death is discussed infra in Part V-A.
28 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119(3) (Supp. 1995).
29 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 241,242,245(b) and 247(c)(1) (Supp. 1995).
30 18 U.S.C.A. § 36(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1995).
31 18 U.S.C.A. § 2245 (Supp. 1995).
32 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251(d) (Supp. 1995).
33 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(i)(2) (Supp. 1995).
34 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3591(a)(2).
35 Cf. United States v. Chandler,996 F.2d 1073 (1lth Cir. 1993),
cert.denied, 114 S. Ct. 2724 (1994) (upholding death sentence under 21
U.S.C. § 848(e)); United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 725 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 353 (1992) (same).
36 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(a) (Supp. 1995). This statuary notice is
somewhat akin to a Bill of Particulars in Virginia practice, and may form
the basis for similar assignments of constitutional error if denied or
incomplete. See Lankford v. Idaho,500 U.S. 110 (1991) (holding death
sentence unconstitutional where state gave written notice that it did not
intend to seek death penalty and presented no evidence in support of trial
court's decision to impose it).
37 The sentencer will be the jury which sat during the guiltinnocence phase of the defendant's trial, unless a) the defendant was
convicted upon a plea of guilty, b) the defendant's case was heard by a
judge only, or c) the prior jury was discharged for good cause. In any of
those situations, a special sentencing jury shall be impaneled. Alternately, ajudge alone may act as sentencer upon motion of the defendant
and agreement of the Government. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(b).

A. Procedural Provisions of Death Penalty Act Generally
In addition to authorizing capital punishment for additional offenses, the Death Penalty Act provides a uniform set of sentencing
procedures for all capital cases which supersedes the procedures provided by the Drug Kingpin Statute. 34 At the time of this writing, no
reported cases had considered the construction of these new provisions.
Nevertheless, because of the substantial similarity between them and 21
U.S.C. § 848, it seems likely that they will withstand facial legal
35
challenge and operate in the manner assumed here.
The two basic procedural rights ofcapital defendants established by
21 U.S.C. § 848 were preserved by the Death Penalty Act. The first is pretrial notification of Government intent to seek the death penalty and the
aggravating factors for which proof will be introduced. 36 The second is
a sentencing hearing, at which the sentencer 37 must balance the appropriate aggravating and mitigating factors in determining whether death
38
should be imposed.
The Death Penalty Act also incorporates nearly all of the basic
procedural aspects of sentencing hearings under the Drug Kingpin
Statute, such as the burdens ofproof 39 and standards for admissibility of
evidence. 40 Perhaps most importantly, federal defendants still cannot be
sentenced to death unless the sentencer finds both a threshold mental
state (e.g. the intent to kill) and at least one aggravating factor related to
the circumstances of the offense or the likely future dangerousness of the
41
defendant.

38 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(e). Note that all jury findings with
respect to aggravating factors must be unanimous, as well as the jury's
recommendation of death. See § 3593(d) and (e). However, ajuror may
consider any statutory or non-statutory mitigating factor which he
considers established, regardless of the number of jurors who concur
with that judgment. See §§ 3592(a), 3593(d). These latter provisions
regarding mitigating evidence are constitutionally-required. See McKoy
v. North Carolina,494 U.S. 433 (1990) (striking down state death
penalty statute requiring unanimous jury findings as to mitigating
factors); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (holding death
penalty unconstitutional where advisory jury was precluded from considering non-statutory mitigating factors, and trial judge refused to
consider them).
39 The government must continue to prove all aggravating factors
beyond a reasonable doubt, while the burden remains on the defendant
to prove the presence of mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence.
See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(c). This type of burden-shifting in capital
schemes was approved by the United States Supreme Court in Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
40 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(c) provides that:
The government may present any information relevant to an
aggravating factor for which notice has been provided ....
Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under
the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials
except that information may be excluded if its probative value
is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
Because the statute provides no standard of proof with respect to
admission of unadjudicated prior conduct, it may provide a basis for
constitutional challenge in cases where such evidence is in fact admitted.
Cf. Fenn, Anything Someone Else Says Can and Will Be Used Against
You in A Court of Law: The Use of UnadjudicatedActs in Capital
Sentencing, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31 (1993).
41 Thepresence of aparticular mental state was formerly a category
of "aggravation" under 21 U.S.C. § 848(n); it is now a separate threshold
determination that must be made by the sentencer. See 18 U.S.C.A. §
3591(a); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (discussing
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B. Significant Differences Between Federal Drug Kingpin
Statute and Death Penalty Act
Although the sentencing procedures under 21 U.S.C. § 848 and the
Death Penalty Act are highly similar, they are not identical. As will be
discussed below, the latter Act is a much more carefully-crafted piece of
legislation, and it was seemingly influenced by recent Supreme Court
opinions regarding the administration of capital sentencing schemes at
the state level.
1. Expansion of Statutory Aggravating Factors
In light of the numerous additional offenses for which capital
punishment is authorized under the Death Penalty Act, the statute
provides three new offense-specific lists of aggravating factors:
aggravators for espionage and treason, 42 aggravators for continuing
criminal enterprise offenses,4 3 and a catch-all category for all remaining
federal capital murders. 44
2. Use of Victim-Impact Evidence

statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope
of the injury and loss suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and
46
any other relevant information.
3. Tilting Toward Mandatory Imposition of the
Death Sentence?
Formerly, capital defendants convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 848 were
entitled to ajury instruction that"[t]he jury or the court, regardless of its
findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, is never
required to impose a death sentence... ."47 This language is conspicuously absent from an otherwise identical provision in the Death Penalty
Act, which now reads as follows:
[The sentencer] shall consider whether all the aggravating
factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh all the
mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence
ofdeath .... Based upon this consideration, the [sentencer] by
unanimous voteshallrecommend whetherthe defendant should
be sentenced to death, to life imprisonment without possibility
48
of release or some other lesser sentence.

In addition to using any other aggravating factor of which the
defense has been notified 4 5 the Government is now permitted to seek the
death penalty based upon the effect of the offense on the victim and the
victim's family, and may include oral testimony, a victim impact

The precise import of this amendment is unclear: although Congress certainly could have made imposition of the death penalty manda-

application of similar four-prong threshold mental state finding). Although it may be a distinction without a difference, the federal capital
sentencing scheme has thus become a "one-tiered" rather than "twotiered" system, because there is now only one class ofaggravating factors
against which the sentencer must balance any available mitigation.
Practitioners should also note that the Death Penalty Act retains the
"heinousness" factor codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(12). See 18
U.S.C.A. § 3592 (c)(6) (Supp. 1995). This factor is highly similar to
Virginia's "vileness" factor, and may be constitutionally-suspect under
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Cf. Lago, Litigating the
"Vileness" Factorin Virginia,Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p.
24 (1991). But see UnitedStates v. Pitera,795 F. Supp. 546 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (rejecting similar challenge to 21 U.S.C. § 848(n)(12) on grounds
that requirement of torture or serious physical abuse provides sufficient
narrowing construction); United States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758
(D.NJ. 1991) (same); UnitedStates v. Cooper,754 F. Supp. 617 (N.D.
Ill. 1990) (same).
42 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(b). The specific aggravating factors for
these offenses include prior espionage or treason offenses, whether a
grave risk to national security resulted from the offense, and whether the
defendant "knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person."
43 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(d). The aggravators specified by the Death
Penalty Act include all of those allowed under 21 U.S.C. § 848(n), plus
the following additional factors: whether the defendant has previously
been convicted of an offense for which a sentence of death or life
imprisonmentwas authorized, use ofa firearm in committing the offense,
whether the offense (or the continuing criminal enterprise of which it was
part) involved distribution of drugs near schools or use of minors in
trafficking, and whether the drugs being distributed were mixed with
"lethal adulterants."
44 § 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c). There are some 15 specific aggravators
in this category, including a wide variety of specific types of prior
convictions, whether the defendant knowingly created a risk of grave
bodily harm to another person, whether the offense was committed for
pecuniary gain or involved substantial planning and premeditation, the
vulnerability of the victim, and the heinousness of the crime. Id.

The mere fact that the offense results in death may also serve as an
aggravating factor for these crimes, thus giving a built-in advantage to
the prosecution. Cf. O'Grady, supra note 3, at 47 (discussing similar
aspect of 21 U.S.C. § 848). However, this type of aggravating factor has
been held constitutional. See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps,484 U.S. 231
(1988) (approving its use in state sentencing scheme); Pitera,795 F.
Supp at 556 (upholding its use in Drug Kingpin Statute).
45 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592. All three lists of aggravating factors include
the following language: "The [sentencer] may consider whether any
other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists." See
Barclayv.Florida,463U.S. 939 (1983) (approving death sentence based
on both statutory and non-statutory aggravators).
Of course, the Government may not rely upon certain types of
aggravating factors as a constitutional matter, even if it does provide
sufficient statutory notice. See, e.g., Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S.Ct.
1093 (1992) (holding First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit introduction in capital sentencing proceeding of defendant's membership in
racist organization, where evidence has no relevance to issues being
decided in proceeding); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983)
(noting in dicta that an aggravating factor is invalid if"it authorizes ajury
to draw adverse inferences from conduct that is constitutionally protected," and citing cases).
46 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(a). The U.S. Supreme Court recently
affirmed the constitutionality of this practice. See Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
47 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) (1988) (amended in 1994).
48 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(e). See also Boyde v. California,494 U.S.
370 (1990) (holding such balancing schemes do not violate the Eighth
Amendment where there is no "reasonable likelihood" that jurors would
believe, they were precluded from considering mitigating evidence
because of aggravating circumstances of crime). Note that the jury is
expressly required to choose between death and life imprisonment,
thereby precluding any potential problems under Simmons v. South
Carolina,114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994). See Pohl & Turner, IfAt FirstYou
Don't Succeed: The Real and PotentialImpact of Simmons v. South
Carolina in Virginia,Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 2 8 (1994).
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49
tory where there is sufficient aggravation as a constitutional matter, it
may simply have intended to disallow the former instruction. Elsewhere,
the Death Penalty Act merely states that "[u]pon recommendation under
[future section 3593(e) of 18 U.S.C.] that the defendant should be
sentenced to death or life imprisonment withoutpossibility of release, the
court shall sentence the defendant accordingly." 50 This provision
precludes judicial override of a jury's recommendation, but does not
51
clarify whether a particular recommendation is ever required.

4. Implementation of Capital Sentences
The Death Penalty Act, like 21 U.S.C. § 848(), categorically
prohibits the execution of any person who is mentally-retarded or was
52
under eighteen years ofage at the time he or she committed the offense.
However, the Act also contains three additional limitations on implementation of capital sentences which are unique to it:
53

a) It forbids execution of a woman while she is pregnant.
b) It excludes crimes committed within the boundaries of
a Native American reservation (unless the appropriate tribal
governing body has agreed that the Act will have effect) and
54
all prosecutions under the Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice.
c) It prohibits execution of any person "who, as a result of
mental disability, lacks the mental capacity to understand the
55
death penalty and why it was imposed on that person."
This standard represents an simplification of the language found in
the Drug Kingpin Act, which prohibited the execution of anyone who,
"as a result of mental disability[,] cannot understand the nature of the
pending proceedings, what such person was tried for, the reason for the
punishment, or the nature of the punishment; or lacks the capacity to
recognize or understand facts which would make the punishment unjust
or unlawful, or lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or
56
to the court."
The method of execution in all federal capital cases is now dictated
by the law of the state where the sentencing court sits, or according to the
law of the state specified by the sentencing court in states where there is
57
no death penalty.

49 See Blystone v. Pennsylvania,494 U.S. 299 (1990) (upholding
state statute which requires maiidatory imposition of death penalty ifjury
unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances).
50 18 U.S.C.A. § 3594 (Supp. 1995).
51 Some light on this problem may be shed by current debate in
Congress over the Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995, cited and
discussed infra in Part IV. The chair of the House Subcommittee on
Crime, Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.), suggested last month that "[u]nder
current law, the jury in a [federal] capital case is given the complete
discretion to impose the death penalty, life imprisonment, or some lesser
penalty regardless of the severity of the facts found to exist." 141 Cong.
Rec. H1401 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995).
52
See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3591,3596(c) (Supp. 1995). The statute thus
limits the imposition of capital punishment to a greater degree than what
is constitutionally-required under recent Supreme Court decisions. See
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (rejecting argument that Constitution categorically prohibits execution ofretarded defendants); Stanford
v. Kentucky, 494 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding Eighth Amendment does not
bar execution of defendants who were sixteen or seventeen at time they
committed offense).
53 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596(c).
54 18 U.S.C.A. § 3598 (Supp. 1995).

5. Appellate Review of Death Sentences
While the basic procedures for review established by 21 U.S.C. §
848(q) have been incorporated into the Death Penalty Act, the scope of
review of death sentences is now more precisely-defined than under prior
law. First of all, the Act makes explicit that death sentences can be
reversed for reasons other than passion, prejudice, or insufficient evidence of aggravation only if the "legal error requiring reversal of the
sentence.., was properly preserved for appeal under the rules ofcriminal
procedure. ' 58 Second, the Actmandates that"[t]he court ofappeals shall
not reverse or vacate a sentence of death on account of any error which
can be harmless, including any erroneous special finding of an aggravating factor, where the Government establishes beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error was harmless." 59
6. Provision of Additional Counsel for Non-Indigents
In one of the few provisions evident of political compromise, the
Death Penalty Act amended 18 U.S.C. § 3005 to a) entitle capital
defendants to two lawyers rather than one and b) require that "at least 1
[of these defense lawyers] shall be learned in the law applicable to capital
cases, and [shall] have free access to the accused at all reasonable
hours." 60 Section 3005, unlike the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4),
makes no requirement of indigence. However, it entitles a capital
defendant only to the appointment of counsel-it does not provide for the
furnishing of "investigative, expert, or other reasonably necessary services....,-61
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES: WHAT YOU WON'T
FIND IN THE DEATH PENALTY ACT, BUT ARE
LIKELY TO SEE IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS
Although the scope of the Death Penalty Act was highly ambitious,
provisions regarding two important issues in all federal capital caseshabeas corpus review and challenges based on racial disparities in
sentencing-had to be dropped from the final version of the Act in order
to secure its passage. Because of the importance of these issues and the

55 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596(c).
56 21 U.S.C. § 848(1); see also Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1985). In Forda plurality of the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
categorically prohibits the execution of the insane, without providing a
definition of sanity for purposes of execution. Id. at 409-10.
However, Justice Powell noted in his concurring opinion that
"the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution only of those who are
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are
to suffer it." Id. at 422 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion,
he pointed out that a standard of sanity which is focused on "the
defendant's ability to assist in his defense"--such as the one found in the
Drug Kingpin Statute-is not constitutionally-mandated because it
gives too little weight to the State's interest in finality and has been
rejected by most state legislatures. Id. at 421 n.2, 422 n.3.
Apparently, the drafters ofthe Death Penalty Act found Justice
Powell's rationale persuasive.
57 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596(a). There was no specified method of
execution under 21 U.S.C. § 848, so the Justice Department issued a rule
specifying lethal injection. See O'Grady, supra note 3, at 47.
58 18 U.S.C.A. § 3595(c)(2)(C) (Supp. 1995).
59 18 U.S.C.A. § 3595(c)(2).
60 18 U.S.C.A. § 3005 (Supp. 1995).
61 See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(A) (1988).
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likelihood that they will be addressed by some form of legislation in the
next couple of years, they are worth examining briefly here.
A. Habeas Corpus Reform
The idea of"reforming" (i.e. limiting) federal habeas corpus review
of death sentences has been gathering political momentum for quite some
time now. 62 Prior efforts, such as the oneproposedby Rep. Don Edwards
(D-California) this past March, were defeated because of Republican
objections to making such limitations contingent upon provision of
63
adequate defense counsel at an early stage in the appeals process.
However, at the time this article went to press, a Republicansponsored bill (the "Effective Death Penalty Act of 1995" 64 ) had already
passed the House by a vote of 297 to 132 and was being considered by
the Senate. 65 The House-approved version of the Effective Death
Penalty Act would restrict habeas corpus review of federal death sentences in two significant ways: 1) it would bar any additional requests for
habeas relief beyond the initial petition, unless the subsequent requests
were based upon newly-discovered evidence of actual innocence of the
crime; 66 and 2) it would impose a two-year period of limitation for
initiation of habeas proceedings regarding federal convictions. 67
B. Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in McCleskey v.
Kemp, 68 Congress has also repeatedly considered legislation that would
allow capital defendants to use statistics demonstrating systematic racial
disparities in sentencing. 69 Last year, a proposed measure along these
lines known as the Racial Justice Act 70 was approved by the House
Judiciary Committee and reported to the floor for consideration. 1
Ultimately, however, the Death Penalty Act adopted the cautionary jury
instruction provided in 21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1) as a less-controversial
72
alternative.
Currently, there is no corresponding "racial justice" legislation
before Congress. Furthermore, approval of such a provision this session

62 Congress considered similar habeas reform proposals during its
development of comprehensive anti-crime legislation in both 1992 and
1994. See Idelson,Anti-CrimeMeasuresMovetoHouse'sFrontBurner,
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 52, No. 10 (March 12,
1994), p. 600, 601.
63 Idelson, High Court Shifts Slightly on Death Row Appeals,
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Jan. 28, 1995),
p. 287.
64 H.R. 729, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
65 See 141 Cong. Rec. H1433 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995). The bill,
which was based upon the recommendations of the Habeas Corpus Study
Committee chaired by retired Justice Powell. Id. at H1400 (statement of
Rep. McCollum).
66 The new evidence of innocence must be clear and convincing in
order for defendants to secure review; an amendment that would have
lowered the burden to a preponderance of the evidence standard was
defeated on the floor of the House. See Idelson, House GOP Crime Bills
Win Easy Passage,Congressional Quarterly Weekly, Vol. 53, No. 6, p.
456,458 (Feb. 11, 1995).
67 See 141 Cong. Rec. H1400-01 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1995). The
legislation would also significantly restrict federal habeas corpus review
of state capital sentences, but a discussion of these provisions falls
beyond the scope of this article.
68 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
69 Such a bill actually passed the House of Representatives in 1990,
but was rejected by that Chamber when reintroduced the following
session. See Idelson, supra note 61, at 601.
70 H.R. 4017, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).

is improbablegiven therecent shift ofcommittee control into Republican
hands.73 Nevertheless, the issue of racial disparities in capital sentencing
remains a serious one to such groups as the Congressional Black
75
Caucus 74 and is likely to be revisited once again in coming years.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Mounting Constitutional Challenges to the New Federal
Death Penalty
As the preceding sections of this article have hopefully made clear,
there is simply very little that is constitutionally questionable about the
"new and improved" federal death penalty. Perhaps the only remaining
ground for constitutional challenge arises from the fact that the sentencing provisions of certain federal crimes authorize-at least implicitlythe imposition of the death penalty in cases where no homicide occurred
during the commission of the offense.
Currently, four federal crimes fall in this category: 1) treason, 2)
certain forms of espionage; 3) trafficking in large quantities ofdrugs; and
4) attempting, authorizing, or advising the killing of any officer, juror, or
76
Imposiwitness in cases involving a continuing criminal enterprise.
tion of capital punishment for these offenses does not run afoul of any
Supreme Court precedent per se, but appears disproportionate under
78
Coker v. Georgia77 if the crime does not result in a homicide.
Assuming that the Court continues to apply the same sort of proportionality analysis found in Coker, death sentences in these cases would
probably fail to pass constitutional muster if challenged.
B. Significance of Death Penalty Act to Capital Defense
Practice in Virginia
Although the Death Penalty Act greatly increased the number of
capital crimes under federal law, the statute is unlikely to make a
significant difference in the actual number of executions or capital
prosecutions in Virginia. This is so for at least three reasons.

71 See Idelson, Major Crime Package Heads for House Floor
Debate, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 52, No. 11, p.
671, 674 (March 19, 1994).
72 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(f) (Supp. 1995). The instruction
provides that "in considering whether a sentence ofdeath is justified, [the
jury] shall not consider the race, color, religious beliefs, national origin,
or sex of the defendant or of any victim .... Id. The statute also requires
each juror to sign a certificate indicating that their decision was not
motivated by such impermissible factors. Id.
73 See Idelson, PartisanFaultLines Spark Delay on Anti-Crime
Bill, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 52, No. 12, p. 743,
744 (March 26, 1994) (noting strong opposition ofmany Republicans to
such "racial justice" provisions).
74
See 141 Cong. Rec. H1402 (daily ed. Feb. 8,1995) (statement of
Rep. Mfume) (noting historical problem of racial disparities in capital
sentencing). Rep. Mfume (D-Califomia) is an influential member of the
Caucus.
75 A recent survey of the racial composition of federal capital
defendants since 1988 found that approximately 83% ofthe prosecutions
had been against African-Americans or Hispanics (34 out of 41 defendants.) See McNally & Bruck, The 1994 Crime Bill: Nationalizing
Death,Federal Death Penalty Defense Newsletter, p. 8 (January 1995).
76 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 794(a) (espionage), 2381 (treason), and §
3591(b) (CCE and drug trafficking offenses).
77 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
78 In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court held that execution "is an
excessive [and therefore unconstitutional] penalty for the rapist who, as
such, does not take human life." Id.at 598 (plurality opinion of White, J.).
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First, many of the capital crimes created or revived by the Act
represent extreme examples of federal jurisdiction (e.g. murder on offshore drilling platforms) which will arise only rarely, if at all.
Second, the federal government has historically been extremely
hesitant to utilize the ultimate sanction, even in those sorts of capital
cases which do frequently arise. 79 Between 1989 and 1994, the Government initiated only forty-one death penalty prosecutions under the Drug
Kingpin Statute, 80 despite the fact that over 1300 drug-related homicides
81
occur each year in the United States.
Third, the willingness of jurors to recommend death in federal
capital cases is much lower than one mightpresume based upon a cursory
examination of recent trends in public opinion polls regarding capital
punishment. 82 While some of the distortions inherent to national polls
are taken into account when their results are published, 83 they remain
inaccurate gauges of opinion because they rely upon simple "yes-no"
questions which fail to measure the intensity of support of those
surveyed. 84 In other words, poll results indicating that approximately
eight out of every ten Americans "favor" capital punishment are seriously misleading because they fail to indicate how many "supporters"
feel strongly enough to actually sentence a person to death.85
In addition, less well-publicized (but far more revealing) polls
indicate that public support levels for capital punishment drop considerably when the alternative of life imprisonment without parole is offered. 86 As previously discussed in Part II, this sentencing option is
currently available for all first-degree murders under federal law.

Finally, although a majority of Americans cite deterrence as their
principal reason for supporting capital punishment when questioned, this
stated justification frequently masks their true motivation: the desire to
see convicted murderers get their "just deserts."' 87 Ironically, in its
attempt to respond to the perceived public clamor for tougher criminal
laws, Congress may have gone beyond the actual retributive desires of
the populace at large and authorized sentences which will never be
imposed. 88

79 For one possible explanation of this phenomenon, consult Paul
O'Grady's excellent Digest article on the Drug Kingpin Statute. See
O'Grady, supranote 3, at 47.
80 See McNally and Bruck, The 1994 Crime Bill, supranote 75, at
8. The first defendant sentenced to death under the Drug Kingpin
Statute, an Alabama drug dealer named David Chandler, has received a
stay of executing pending further collateral review of his case under 28
U.S.C. Section 2255. Id. at 7. Mr. Chandler's case raised many of the
same issues as Simmons v. South Carolina,supra note 47, because the
trial judge failed to advise the jury that the defendant had no chance of
receiving parole if he were sentenced to life. Id. However, a petition for
rehearing relying upon Simmons was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court
on August 24, 1994. Id.
81 See O'Grady, supra note 3, at 40.
82 According to results from The Gallup Poll, public support for
capital punishment sank to its lowest point in 1966; at that time, a
plurality of those surveyed actually opposed the death penalty. See
Dionne, Jr., CapitalPunishmentGainingFavor as PublicSeeks Retribution, Corrections Today, Aug. 1990, p. 181. However, the percentage
of Americans who favorexecuting convicted murderers has sporadically
increased ever since, reaching its current level of around eighty percent
in the late 1980's. Id.
83 These are typically expressed as the poll's "margin of error,"
which reflects not only that the survey base may not be sufficiently large
to constitute a truly representative cross-section of the population, but
also the more fundamental problem that people being surveyed will lie
when they think their opinion is inconsistent with prevailing social
mores. Unfortunately, this latter problem is particularly acute with
respect to a highly controversial topic such as capital punishment.
84
This deficiency has been widely noted and criticized in the social
science literature on public opinion regarding capital punishment. See,
e.g., Vidmar & Ellsworth, Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, in
Capital Punishment in the United States 125,138 (Bedeau & Pierce eds.,
1976).

85 Equating the abstract support for capital punishment found in
poll results with sentencing decisions is highly-suspect because most
people are poorly-informed about the death penalty, and the topic has
little personal relevance to them. See Bohm, American Death Penalty
Attitudes: A CriticalExaminationof Recent Evidence, Criminal Justice
and Behavior, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 3 80 , 38 1 (September 1987.) Consistent
with that fact, one jury simulation study found that less than one-third of
those who initially voiced support for capital punishment were willing to
actually recommend a death sentence when placed in a trial-like setting.
See Haas and Inciardi, LingeringDoubts About a PopularPunishment,
in Challenging Capital Punishment 11 (Haas & Inciardi eds., 1988).
86 For example, a 1989 Amnesty International poll of 822 votingage Virginia residents found that support for the death penalty dropped
from 64 percent to 45 percent when respondents were provided with the
option of life imprisonment without parole.
87 See Bohm, American Death PenaltyAttitudes, supranote 85, at
383.
88 Of the seventeen defendants who have been sentenced for federal
capital crimes since 1988, eleven have been sentenced to some form of
life sentence after the jury voted against death. See McNally & Bruck,
The 1994 CrimeBill,supranote 75, at 8. The size ofthefederaldeathrow,
which currently stands at six defendants, has not increased since July
1993. Id.
89 See O'Grady, supra note 3, at 48.
90 Both of the following practitioners are highly skilled at defending federal capital cases and represent valuable contact persons:

C. Responsibilities of Virginia Defense Attorneys in
Federal Capital Cases
Although the landscape of the law changed considerably with the
passage of the Death Penalty Act last year, two of the observations
regarding federal capital cases that previously appeared in this Digest
remain applicable. First, it seems likely that the federal bench will
continue to rely on state practitioners with capital experience to defend
federal defendants because of the rarity with which such cases will
arise. 89 Second, while certain groups of individuals receive greater
statutory protection under the U.S. Code than under Virginia law, the
protection of the rights of all capital defendants is principally a function
of their defense counsel's competent advocacy. To ensure she can
provide such advocacy, defense counsel is strongly encouraged to
contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse or attorneys experienced in defense of federal capital cases 90 as soon as the need arises.
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